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ABSTRACT 
The EMU fiscal adjustment paths of the four Southern Europe 
members (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal – SE-4) vary along two 
dimensions: a) cross-temporal (pre- and post-EMU accession) and b) 
cross-country. We account for the cross-temporal variation by 
distinguishing between the ‘hard’ and ‘softer’ EMU conditionality of 
the pre- and post-accession stage. External constraints in the form of 
the Maastricht eligibility criteria constituted a significant common 
‘push’ factor in the fiscal stabilization process of EMU candidate 
countries throughout the 1990s. However, their potent does not 
necessarily lead to fiscal sustainability as demonstrated by the post-
accession budgetary outlook of the SE-4. We account for the cross-
country variation by introducing additional ‘pull’ factors related to 
the reform content, context and capability (such as unemployment, 
the level of social concertation, and government effectiveness). Only 
in cases where such factors were at work did governments engage in 
structural reforms to consolidate public finances instead of the less 
controversial path of macroeconomic policy reform. 
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Fiscal Adjustment in Southern Europe: 
the Limits of EMU Conditionality 
 
 
1. Introduction 
External economic pressures in various forms of conditionality policy have 
long been associated with domestic economic reform. The agreement for the 
establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) among EU member 
states entailed significant process of fiscal adjustment to meet the Maastricht 
eligibility criteria. The EMU adjustment process has reinstated the potential of 
external constraints and provided impetus for further research, given especially 
that Eurozone expansion is an inevitable corollary of EU enlargement. The EU 
will assess the readiness of aspirant entrants amid concerns about a premature 
EMU entry before achieving financial sustainability. The fiscal adjustment zeal 
of some new EU members resembles in varying degrees past efforts of the four 
Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal– henceforth: 
SE-4) that paved the way for their EMU accession despite negative speculation 
in the early 1990s. Thus, reviewing the SE-4 fiscal adjustment efforts can lead 
to useful conclusions about the role and function of EMU constraints.  
Despite the socio-economic and political similarities between the SE-4, and the 
common nature of the EMU external constraints, we can distinguish two kinds 
of variation in their fiscal adjustment paths: a cross-temporal variation (pre- 
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and post-EMU accession) and a cross-country one. The SE-4 constituted a 
distinct group, upon which EMU exercised very strong appeal because of its 
economic and political implications. It promised monetary stability and the 
security of a potentially strong international currency. It also involved a 
position at the core of a differentiated integration process. The potent EMU 
attraction helped overcome domestic policymaking constraints and inertia, 
bringing about budgetary consolidation in all four countries. However, post 
accession (Italy, Spain, and Portugal entered EMU in 1999; Greece in 2001), 
the SE-4 have followed divergent trajectories. While Spain has internalized 
EMU fiscal orthodoxy becoming consequently a stark defender of the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the other three have experienced 
significant difficulties in complying with SGP budget constraints, adopting 
instead a revisionist stance in the Pact’s reform debate (Blavoukos and 
Pagoulatos, 2008).  
We account for this dual divergence (cross-temporal and cross-country) by 
drawing analytically on three different literature strands. First, the literature on 
the political economy of policy reform sets the overarching framework for the 
role of external constraints in initiating and carrying out policy reforms. The 
Maastricht eligibility criteria for EMU accession and the terms of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) have functioned as such external constraints. Second, 
we borrow the conditionality concept from the International Relations field to 
account for the decreasing power of external constraints between the pre- and 
post-EMU-accession stage. Third, we make use of the insights of the more 
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specialised literature on fiscal consolidation to examine the different 
trajectories of the SE-4 in terms of fiscal adjustment.  
We attribute the cross-temporal divergence to the shift from the ‘hard 
conditionality’ of the accession process to the ‘softer’ conditionality of the 
post-accession stage under SGP rules.1 Once the external constraint was 
relaxed following a positive accession decision, the fiscal stance depended 
largely on the quality of prior fiscal consolidation undertaken in order to obtain 
EMU membership. As suggested by the relevant literature on fiscal adjustment, 
a consolidation strategy aimed at appropriate expenditure cuts and structural 
reforms produces more sustainable fiscal adjustment if compared to primarily 
revenue-based consolidation.2 EMU conditionality set nominal accession 
targets without prescribing the modality of achieving them. Therefore, the 
external constraint was a ‘push’ factor to consolidation without however 
ensuring fiscal sustainability. Only where additional ‘pull’ factors were at work 
did structural reforms take place. These ‘pull’ factors involved the content and 
scope of reform (we single out severe unemployment necessitating structural 
reforms), the context of reform (facilitating or constraining –we look at the 
degree of social concertation), and the capability for reform (we compare 
measurements of government effectiveness). All three ‘pull’ factors were at 
                                                 
1
 Our line of (positive) analysis holds independently of whether one agrees or not with the normative 
blueprint of SGP-prescribed fiscal orthodoxy. We happen to find the main tenets of SGP revisionism 
(more accommodation of cyclical downswings, greater focus on debt sustainability) well justified. In 
addition, expenditure cutting is highly controversial if it involves curtailing necessary social programs 
and transfers. In such case, “adjustment” is not a welcome development.  
2
 By structural reforms we look at privatization/ liberalization, pension system and labour market 
reform, as these were the items that were prioritized by the dominant economic paradigm of the 1990s 
–and subsequently incorporated in the Lisbon agenda. 
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work in the case of Spain, but far less so in Italy, Greece or Portugal, where 
their absence limited reform only to the macroeconomic policy realm. Thus, 
these ‘pull’ factors account for cross-country variation.    
The next section elaborates on the interplay between policy reform, EMU 
conditionality, and fiscal consolidation. Following that, we highlight the dual 
divergence, reviewing the adjustment efforts and fiscal performance of the SE-
4 directly before and after EMU accession. We then account for the different 
trajectories of the SE-4, before concluding with some broader observations 
regarding the use and function of conditionality. 
 
2. EMU Conditionality and Fiscal Adjustment  
The use of international variables to account for domestic structural reforms 
was on the ascendance in the 1970s and early 1980s, given the external 
financial assistance granted extensively under the condition of domestic 
economic policy adjustment. However, conditionality policy generated both 
virtuous and vicious cycles of influence in recipient countries (Stallings 1992). 
As a result of the mixed record of conditionality, emphasis shifted to domestic, 
institutional and socio-political, mediating factors. Two main analytical 
approaches have emerged: a liberal, focusing on social preferences and interest 
groups; and an institutionalist, looking primarily at domestic institutional 
arrangements (Haggard 2000: 21-22). Additional insights have highlighted the 
implementation stage of reforms and the importance of building consensus 
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around reform strategies as condition for their political sustainability (Stiglitz 
2000: 556, 571). In that respect, government effectiveness is crucial not only at 
the initiation stage but even more importantly at the implementation stage, 
when the initial impetus needs to be translated into actual policy outcomes.  
Though conditionality may have slipped outside the main research focus, it 
remains highly pertinent. Formal conditionality policy, like institutional 
membership of an international organization or entitlement to other benefits, 
imposes direct external constraints to the targeted countries (Dyson 2006: 13-
35).3 In general, (formal) conditionality entails the use of incentives to alter a 
state’s behaviour or policies. Based on power asymmetries, it links perceived 
benefits for a state by another state or international organization to the 
fulfilment of specific conditions. In that respect, conditionality is an implicitly 
coercive instrument to secure compliance with certain desired policy or 
institutional outcomes (Hughes et al 2004: 525). While traditionally associated 
with international economic organizations (Killick 1998), the use of political 
conditionality has grown impressively in recent years, evolving into a primary 
instrument for the international community to exercise exogenous pressures for 
political and institutional isomorphism (Checkel 2000). Positive conditionality 
refers to granting benefits; negative conditionality involves the reduction, 
suspension or termination of the perceived benefits (Smith 1997: 6).  
                                                 
3
 In contrast, indirect external constraints exercise an informal kind of conditionality raising the 
attraction of the formal conditionality policy. Such constraints relate to mechanisms of ideational 
contagion mainly through interacting epistemic communities (new policy paradigms like the ‘sound 
money and finance’) or pressure emanating from the globalized policy environment (liberalization of 
capital flows, etc.).  
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Judging whether a country meets set criteria is often highly subjective, 
politicizing the entire conditionality policy and linking it with developments 
beyond the originally specified criteria. Lack of clarity and target mobility 
create frustration and disillusionment, resulting in less vigorous efforts to 
comply with the set criteria (Grabbe 1999). An additional concern is the 
primacy of output focus (satisfaction of specific criteria) at the expense of an 
interest in the modality of reaching such output (Smith 1997: 8-9). Given such 
focus, conditionality often ends up faring badly, ignoring the national political, 
socioeconomic and institutional context, within which it is transcribed into 
specific policy actions (Killick 1998: 156). Finally conditionality, particularly 
in its more constraining versions, generates an ownership problem 
domestically, with reforms often seen as externally imposed, undermining 
domestic support (Checkel 2000). Subsequently, in such cases, compliance 
problems emerge, raising doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of 
conditionality policies as well as the endurance of achieved reforms. 
The EU has relied extensively on conditionality policy in its relations with third 
countries (Smith 1997) and most importantly with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (cf. Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, Grabbe 2001, etc). Intra-EU, 
EMU membership was conditional upon meeting the Maastricht criteria, set in 
place to ensure fiscal adjustment. In these cases, conditionality relied on the 
attraction of membership and its perceived benefits, with membership criteria 
functioning as a set of external constraints (vincolo esterno) for aspirant 
members (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). Although such constraints, 
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emanating from the supra-national level, may seemingly curtail state autonomy, 
such a loss may actually empower the state to pursue its own public interest 
against strong societal and sectoral interests (Moravcsik 1994). Invoking 
domestically a ‘tied hands’ policy approach and shifting blame to the supra-
national level, aspirant members are able, in view of the membership objective, 
to engineer otherwise elusive domestic reforms. External constraints and 
“scapegoating” may have either a limited impact, involving -often temporary- 
shifts of relative power in the policymaking process, or a much broader one, 
bringing along paradigm shifts with new policy norms transcending the overall 
policymaking system (Featherstone 2004).    
In the pre-EMU accession phase, the power of exclusion exercised intense 
pressure on aspirant members to redress fiscal imbalances and bring about 
fiscal adjustment (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The majority view attributes 
fiscal adjustment to the constraining impact of the Maastricht criteria (e.g. 
Busemeyer 2004, Buti and Giudice 2002, Rotte 1998, Rotte and Zimmermann 
1998; contra Pamp 2007, Freitag and Sciarini 2001). The fact is that the 
Maastricht criteria gave more emphasis on fiscal consolidation rather than 
fiscal sustainability.4 The former could be achieved through relying on 
macroeconomic policy reform without need to engage in substantial structural 
                                                 
4
 Fiscal consolidation is a much debated and highly arbitrary concept, especially as regards what 
constitutes a fiscal consolidation episode and how to assess success in terms of sustainability. The 
relevant literature has focused on the timing, duration, composition, and the political, economic and 
institutional underpinnings of fiscal adjustment (cf. Alesina et al. 1998, Alesina and Perotti 1996, 
McDermott and Wescott 1996, etc.) but less so on the role of external constraints. For our needs we 
adhere to the definition of successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidation episodes elaborated in these 
works. The emphasis of the Maastricht criteria on consolidation rather than sustainability holds despite 
the debt criterion, which focused on the fiscal prospects of EMU candidate countries. On the course to 
accession, the debt criterion was sidelined, as the nominal target was replaced with a steady decrease of 
the public debt rate, a more arbitrary and diluted concept.    
  8 
reforms that involved a much higher political cost for the incumbent 
government. 
Post accession, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was set in place to ensure 
fiscal prudence. However, the SGP monitoring and corrective mechanism has 
not been equally effective as shown by the November 2003 crisis and the 
subsequent reform. The pre-accession conditionality policy was output-
focused, driven by the need to foster the new currency’s credibility, and could 
capitalize on the threat of exclusion to achieve tangible results. Compared to 
the ‘hard conditionality’ of the pre-accession period, the SGP prescribed a 
softer and much more politicized form of conditionality, unable to resort to 
equally powerful instruments of coercion. The shelving of the automatic 
application of penalties on Stage 3 participants during ‘Stability Pact’ 
negotiations in 1996-97 politicised the control process of fiscal discipline 
within the Eurozone, subjecting it to the ECOFIN power constellation 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2004: 769-70, 776-77). As a result, should the political 
environment be conducive, member states could be tempted to free-ride on the 
Euro credibility and partly relax the budgetary pressure of the external 
constraints. The SGP ‘softer conditionality’ provided leeway for such members 
to breach the letter and spirit of the Pact, generating concern over a 
‘consolidation fatigue’ (von Hagen 2005: 14). 
Given such leeway, the continuity of fiscal balance after EMU accession would 
rely heavily on the modality of achieving fiscal adjustment in the pre-accession 
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period. After all, even within highly restrictive fiscal policy environments, 
national governments still manage to come up with different responses to fiscal 
adjustment (Mulas-Granados 2006). Such national policy autonomy was 
furthered by the output focus of the pre-accession period. Meeting the 
Maastricht numerical targets did not entail or envisage any prescriptive 
pathway to fiscal consolidation, sidelining concerns about the quality of fiscal 
adjustment. Individual EMU candidates retained responsibility for their own 
euro entry strategies and had a good deal of discretion over the sequence of 
required reforms as long as the policy outcome conformed to the set targets 
(Dyson 2006: 11).   
This indifference over the modality of fiscal consolidation ignored existing 
evidence that budget consolidations relying too heavily on the revenue side (by 
raising taxes) rather than on the expenditure side (by cutting the appropriate 
kind of spending) are less likely to be successful and sustainable (Perotti et al. 
1998, Buti and Sapir 1998). Unsuccessful consolidations rely heavily on 
increasing government revenues, while successful ones tend to lay heavy 
emphasis on downsizing government spending. Furthermore, successful 
consolidations involve larger cutbacks of current government spending rather 
than public investment spending. Finally, successful consolidations tackle more 
forcefully politically sensitive spending items, such as transfers, subsidies and 
government wages as compared to unsuccessful ones (von Hagen et al. 2001: 
8-9). As a result, successful consolidations are characterized by continued 
improvements in the budget balance following the conclusion of the 
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consolidation phase. In success cases government expenditure on subsidies, 
social transfers and wages remain relatively constant and revenues increase. In 
contrast, unsuccessful consolidations are followed by a significant deterioration 
of the budget balance with an increase of expenditure on the sensitive budget 
items and declining revenues relative to potential output (von Hagen et al. 
2001: 10). 
Bringing together these insights, the direct implication for the EMU case is that 
fiscal sustainability could derive neither from the ‘hard conditionality’ of the 
pre-accession period nor the ‘softer conditionality’ of the post-accession stage. 
True, the ‘hard conditionality’ of the Maastricht criteria may have contributed 
to the fiscal consolidation of aspirant members. But the viability of fiscal 
adjustment in the post-accession phase was determined by the modality of 
fiscal consolidation in each country, whether based on macroeconomic policy 
or more far-reaching structural reforms. In other words, the way member states 
responded to the EMU ‘vincolo esterno’ affected their fiscal stance afterwards. 
Eurozone members that engaged in a consistent effort to stabilize their fiscal 
condition in the course to EMU primarily through expenditure-driven measures 
aimed to tackle economic structural rigidities have subsequently avoided fiscal 
imbalances. In contrast, member-states that focused on achieving membership 
with only nominal fiscal stabilization, primarily through revenue-driven 
measures and perhaps some accounting massaging, have experienced a post-
accession deterioration of their fiscal condition. 
  11 
In the following section, we look at the fiscal adjustment of the SE-4 and then 
account for their different trajectories. 
 
3. Fiscal Adjustment in the SE-4 
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of the primary and general government 
balance in the SE-4 from 1990 to 2005. We break this period into two sub-
periods (1990-1997/9 and 1997/9–2005) separated by the EMU decision year.  
 
Table 1: Primary and General Government Balance in the SE-04 1990-05 
YEAR GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
 
GGB PB GGB PB GGB PB GGB PB 
 
        
1990 -15.4 -6 -11.8 -1.3 -6.1 -- -- -- 
1991 -11.4 -2.2 -11.7 0.2 -8.1 -- -- -- 
1992 -11.1 -1.3 -10.7 2 -6 -- -- -- 
1993 -13.4 -2 -10.3 2.8 -8.9 -- -- -- 
1994 -9.4 3.1 -9.3 2.1 -6.6 -- -- -- 
1995 -10.2 1 -7.6 3.9 -4.5 -- -- -- 
1996 -7.4 3.1 -7.1 4.4 -4 1.4 -4.9 0.4 
1997 -4 4.2 -2.7 6.7 -3 1.3 -3.2 1.6 
1998 -2.5 5.3 -2.8 5.2 -2.6 0.9 -3 1.2 
1999 -1.8 6.5 -1.7 5 -2.8 0.4 -1.2 2.4 
2000 -4.1 4 -0.6 5.8 -2.8 0.4 -0.9 2.4 
2001 -6.1 3.7 -3.2 3.6 -4.2 -1.2 -0.5 2.6 
2002 -4.9 1.1 -2.9 2.7 -2.9 0 -0.3 2.4 
2003 -5.8 -0.3 -3.4 1.1 -2.9 -0.2 0 2.3 
2004 -6.9 -1.5 -3.4 1.3 -3.2 -0.5 -0.1 1.9 
2005 -4.5 0.5 -4.1 0.4 -6 -3.3 1.1 2.9 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2005 
 
For Greece, Italy, and Portugal, the first period is characterised by a continuous 
improvement of the primary and general government balance, whereas the second by 
a deterioration of both.  The Greek primary balance moved from a 6% GDP deficit in 
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1990 to a 6.5% surplus in 1999 only to drop down to 0.5% in 2005; the general 
government deficit dropped from 15.4% to around 2% in 1999 but climbed up again 
in subsequent years to 4.5% in 2005. In Italy, the primary surplus soared to 6.7% in 
1997 but dropped substantially afterwards (to 0.4% in 2005) and the general 
government deficit was reduced from 11.8% in 1990 to 2.7% in 1997 but moved 
again upwards to 4.1% in 2005. In Portugal, the primary balance after 1997 moved 
from surplus to deficit (from 1.3% in 1997 to -3.3% in 2005) and the general 
government deficit also exhibited an upward trend (from 3% in 1997 to 6% in 2005). 
Only for Spain, the EMU decision year does not indicate any change in either the 
primary balance, which continued to improve (from 0.4% in 1997 to 2.9% in 2005), 
or general government deficit, which kept dropping (from a 3.2% deficit in 1997 to a 
1.1% surplus in 2005).  
3.1. Fiscal consolidation in the course to EMU membership 
Table 2 provides a detailed outlook of the SE-4 fiscal consolidation efforts up 
to the decision for EMU accession (for Italy, Portugal, and Spain 1997; for 
Greece 1999), in terms of both macroeconomic policy and structural reforms. 
The main elements of the Italian strategy in the course to EMU membership 
comprised a continuous increase of tax pressure, a decrease of public debt 
servicing expenditure –achieved through falling interest rates—, partial reform 
of pension regimes, a suppression of public sector employment and a squeeze 
on the cost of local government (Radaelli 2002: 232). Despite the government 
intentions of a balanced fiscal adjustment (Documento di Programmazione 
  
Table 2: Fiscal Consolidation in the SE-4  (1991-1997/9) 
 GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
Fiscal Consolidation 
Public Expenditure  
 
MEASURES: 
 
- Increase in wage (OECD 
Economic Survey 1998) 
and transfer payments 
(Bank of Greece 1996) 
-Restraints on government 
purchases   
-Restraints on capital 
expenditures (achieved 
through equity flotation in 
public enterprises instead 
of direct capital transfers) 
(OECD Economic Survey 
1998: 48) 
 
OUTCOME: 
 
- Primary expenditures rise 
(von Hagen et al. 2001: 
100-1) 
MEASURES: 
 
- Controls in public sector pay and 
hiring 
- Curtailment of social security 
benefits (especially pension 
system deficiencies and health 
spending  
- Squeeze on transfers to 
subnational levels of government 
(OECD Economic Surveys, 1997: 
63-77, 1996: 44, 1995: 39-47, 
1992: 38-47) 
 
OUTCOME: 
 
- Stabilisation of wage payments 
and social transfers 
- Primary expenditures drop but 
mainly due to drop of public 
investment  
(Bank of Italy 1998: 233) 
 
MEASURES: 
 
-Expenditure ceilings for public 
sector wage (Convergence 
Program 1991: Annex 4) 
- Strong fiscal expansion after the 
1992-3 crisis (social security 
expenditure and transfer 
payments) 
- Further moderate increases in 
social transfers and wage 
expenditure (Bank of Portugal 
1995-7; von Hagen et al. 2001: 
115) 
-Additional control measures in 
1996-7 (OECD Economic Surveys 
1998-9) 
 
OUTCOME: 
 
- Growth of primary expenditures 
compensated by great fall of 
interest expenditure (due to 
interest rates decline)  
MEASURES: 
 
-Wage expenditure moderation 
(agreement with Unions to raise 
wages and pensions in line with the 
official inflation target and not the 
actual inflation from 1995-7) (OECD 
Economic Survey 1996:138) 
- Freeze on public sector 
employment  
- Financial agreement with regional 
governments to curtail expenditure 
and government consumption 
- Trimming of social transfers  
(von Hagen et al 2001:118-20) 
 
OUTCOME: 
 
- Public expenditures drop due to 
control of primary expenditures but 
also fall of public investment  
(Balmaseda and Sebastián 2003: 
209) 
(Cont. in next page) 
  
Table 2 (cont.) 
Structural  
Reforms 
 
Social Policies 
and  
Pension 
System  
- Modest small-scale reform in 
early 1990s 
- Report of ad hoc technocratic 
committee in 1996 (Spraos 
Committee) shelved after strong 
sectoral reactions 
- 2001 reform attempt met equally 
strong resistance and was 
withdrawn  
   
- Double reform (1992 and 1995-
6) but no final solution  
(OECD Economic Surveys 1996, 
1992) 
- Additional reforms in 1997 by the 
Prodi government (OECD 
Economic Survey 1999: 61). 
- Limited reform but only at a later 
stage (in 2002 and more 
substantially in 2004) 
- ‘Social Pact for Progress’ in 1991 
limited success 
- Restriction of unemployment 
benefits, adjustments in healthcare 
system, pension system  (Based on 
the Toledo Pact- 1995 and the Social 
Security Consolidation and 
Rationalisation Act, 1997) 
(Bank of Spain 1992-6) 
Labour Market  - Confidence Pact (1997) and 
following legislative activities (in 
1998 – Law 2639/98 and 2000 – 
Law 2874/00) had limited results 
(Papadimitriou 2005: 382, 392) 
 
- Reorganization of collective 
bargaining institutions 
(establishment of a new central 
agency – 1993) (Molina and 
Rhodes 2007, Perez 2000) 
-Early Economic and Social 
Agreement (AES-1990)  
- Problematic implementation of 
Strategic Social Pact (1996-9) 
(ILO Report) 
 
 
- Substantial flexibility after a three-
year pact (1997) 
Privatisation  - Extensive record with a  
revenue-raising focus (Pagoulatos 
2005: 360)  
-Extensive record but the 1994 
Privatisation Law a compromise 
solution (Toninelli 2000)  
- Extensive record but with no 
restructuring of industrial base  
- Establishment of the state 
holding company (Partest) 
facilitated the revenue-raising 
focus (Clifton et al 2003: 70-72) 
 
- Extensive record but revenue-
driven; in need for greater 
liberalization and sectoral re-
regulation (Bank of Spain 1999: 25) 
Source: Own Representation. 
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Economico-Finanziaria, May 1991), budgetary consolidation eventually relied 
heavily on revenue policies (taxes and social security contributions) and less so 
on curtailing expenditure (Bank of Italy 1998: 233). Many of the revenue 
measures were temporary, enacted through supplementary or ‘emergency’ 
budgets, when the actual budget deviated strongly from forecasts or when the 
assessment for Eurozone membership was approaching. Thus, especially in the 
second half of the nineties, concerns were voiced about the adjustment of 
public finances, urging for a more determined reduction in current spending, 
increase in public investment and decrease in taxes and social security 
contributions in relation to GDP (Bank of Italy 1999: 28). 
The initiatives to curtail public sector pay were partly undermined by the 
fragmentation of the wage bargaining system (von Hagen et al. 2001: 107), 
which led the government to reform collective bargaining institutions (cf. Perez 
2000). Thus, in Italy, EMU strengthened pre-existing corporatist tendencies 
(Featherstone 2004). However, reform efforts were limited to wage 
negotiations without tackling other considerable rigidities in the Italian labour 
market (Bank of Italy 1999: 30). In the same vein, the pension system was 
reformed twice in the first half of the 1990s. However, reforms 
notwithstanding, pension expenditure continued to rise in the subsequent years, 
urging a more far-reaching pension system reform (Bank of Italy 1999: 28, 30). 
Privatisation was extensive (see Table 3), driven by the revenue-raising need 
and EU pressures to deregulate certain sectors but also regarded as a means to 
attract direct private investment and to undermine the ‘crony capitalism’ 
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associated with a hard core of ‘national institutional investors’ (Clifton et al. 
2003: 52-55). It overall remained a revenue-oriented rather than a structural 
reform policy (cf. Toninelli 2000).  
 
Table 3:  Country Breakdown of Amounts Raised by Privatisation (1990-2001) 
(in USD million) 
YEAR GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
1990 - - 1092 172 
1991 - - 1002 - 
1992 - 759 2206 830 
1993 35 3039 422 3222 
1994 73 9077 1123 1458 
1995 44 10131 2362 2941 
1996 558 11230 3001 2680 
1997 1395 23945 4909 12532 
1998 3960 15138 4299 11618 
1999 4880 25594 1620 1128 
2000 1384 9729 3256 1079 
2001 1305 2653 353 741 
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, No 82, June 2002.  
 
In Portugal, the revised Convergence Programme after the 1992-93 currency 
crisis placed a strong emphasis on fiscal consolidation on its own merit and not 
only as a by-product of negative inflation dynamics and falling interest rates 
(von Hagen et al. 2001: 113). Still, significant gains from the decline in real 
interest rates permitted Portugal to meet the Maastricht criteria without 
enacting any major curtailment of government primary expenditure, which 
actually increased during the consolidation period. Despite this rise of current 
primary expenditure, the budget deficit declined as a result of the sharp 
reduction in interest expenditure and the high growth of tax revenue (Bank of 
Portugal 1999: 21-22). This interest-free ride conveyed an image of nominal 
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fiscal convergence and a short-lived illusion of fiscal discipline (Braga de 
Macedo 2003: 191-92). 
The gradually restored fiscal credibility of the Portuguese government was not 
fed by additional structural measures to bolster the diminishing competitiveness 
and sustain the catch-up process. Instead, it made social groups more 
intemperate (Braga de Macedo 2003: 183-84, 192). Strong increases in real 
wages and relative unit labour costs in 1998 and 1999 (Bank of Portugal 1999: 
26) resulted from the problematic application of the comprehensive Strategic 
Social Pact for the 1996-99 period, set in place to engineer labour market 
reforms (ILO Report). In the social policy field, the incremental shift from the 
massive infrastructure building to increased expenditure for classic social risks 
(pensions, unemployment benefits) contributed to the deterioration of the 
primary balance with no evident conclusive success of the specific reform mix 
(Guillén et al. 2003: 259-61). The extensive privatisation programme (see 
Table 3) was primarily used to improve artificially fiscal performance and 
nominal convergence to the deficit criterion, through the creation of a state 
holding company (Partest) that enabled the government to register privatisation 
proceeds as fiscal revenue. The government remained very selective even 
protectionist, prioritising specific strategic national investors while sidelining 
more objective criteria based on the investor’s financial position, technological 
or operative know-how (Clifton et al 2003: 70-72).     
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The Greek path to EMU placed strong emphasis on high public investment 
levels to achieve faster growth and fiscal restraint through both revenue 
increases and expenditure reductions (Greek Convergence Program 1994–
updated version). However, despite intentions for a balanced focus, fiscal 
consolidation and the improvement of the primary budget balance in the 1990s 
relied heavily on the significant and almost continuous rise of public revenues 
as percentage of the (cyclically adjusted) GDP and much less so on the 
curtailment of primary public expenditure (Bank of Greece 1999: 32). Public 
expenditure rise was due to the increase in wage and transfer payments (von 
Hagen et al. 2001: 100-101) whereas restraint was more successful on 
government purchases and capital expenditures, with a substantial reduction in 
the latter category achieved through equity flotation in public enterprises 
instead of direct capital transfers (OECD Economic Survey 1998: 48). Making 
the most of permitted accounting discretion, the Greek government moved 
(parts of) public investment expenditure off primary budgetary expenditures 
without affecting actual levels of public investment but improving overall 
primary expenditure performance. 
Whereas fiscal consolidation produced tangible results bringing down the 
deficit within the Maastricht limits, the record of structural reforms during the 
same period was mixed. Labour market reforms, initiated in 1997, failed to 
address the key weaknesses of the Greek labour market, being neither radical 
nor consensual and failing to produce any meaningful results in curbing the 
most important labour market rigidities (Papadimitriou 2005: 382, 392). The 
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small-scale pension reform of the early 1990s generated some savings in the 
subsequent years (von Hagen et al. 2001: 101), but was modest and did not 
provide a long-term solution in the face of stiff union opposition and internal 
party dissension (Featherstone 2004). Concerns about pension system viability 
led to the establishment of an ad hoc committee of technocrats in 1996 (‘Spraos 
Committee’), the Report of which was shelved after confronting strong sectoral 
reactions (Featherstone et al. 2001). Privatization policy was more successful 
(see Table 3), but instead of alleviating public debt, the high proceeds were 
partly used to finance current government expenditure (Pagoulatos 2005: 360).    
In Spain, fiscal consolidation was based on wage moderation (accompanied by 
a freeze on public sector employment and a financial agreement with regional 
governments that had in the past conducted a more expansionary public pay 
policy), trimming of social transfers and curtailment of government 
consumption (von Hagen et al 2001: 118-20). Wage control, exercised through 
collective bargaining agreements, was fundamental in restructuring public 
finances, with the increase in real wages not exceeding labour productivity and 
hence not affecting negatively competitiveness and growth (Bank of Spain 
1998: 12). However, the decline of public investment during the same period 
raised concerns about the prospects of real convergence with the EMU partners 
(Balmaseda and Sebastián 2003: 209). On the revenue side, a major income tax 
reform in 1999 aimed to stimulate economic activity by increasing disposable 
income (Bank of Spain 1999: 18-20).  
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The EMU third stage found the Spanish economy in a position to pursue real 
convergence, featuring a successful liberalisation programme and a significant 
record of structural reforms already under way (Bank of Spain 1998: 19-25). 
This was made feasible by the successful social concertation achieved during 
the fiscal consolidation period, which paved the way for extensive pension and 
labour market reforms. Labour market rigidities were significantly tackled after 
a three-year pact was signed in 1997 between the main trade unions and 
employers’ associations. Pension and healthcare system reforms were initiated 
with the 1995 ‘Toledo Pact’, an agreement of an ad hoc Parliamentary 
Committee to which the main interest groups adhered, and came into force with 
subsequent legislation (Featherstone 2004). In general, the Spanish welfare 
state witnessed a clear redesign of several key social policy aspects with 
emphasis on rationalisation, increased efficiency and cost-control (Guillén et al. 
2003: 249-252). The privatisation record of both the Socialist government in 
the early 1990s and Aznar’s Conservatives from 1996 onwards was very 
extensive (see Table 3), despite the differences in scope and ideological 
underpinnings (Clifton et al. 2003: 74). However, in certain areas, privatisation 
preceded sectoral re-regulation and market liberalisation, suggesting possibly a 
policy focused on revenue-raising rather than restructuring the production base 
or improving market functioning (cf. Bank of Spain 1999: 25).  
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3.2. Fiscal performance in the post-accession EMU era 
Once membership was achieved, the SE-4 could potentially free ride on the 
common currency’s credibility without being individually penalized by 
financial markets. Given the politicisation of the ECOFIN decision, the SE-4 
could count on a favourable Council disposition towards greater discretion or 
toleration of a less austere fiscal stance. Laxity expectations remained low in 
the first couple of years after 1999 when the rhetoric for strict application of 
SGP rules aimed to bolster the new currency’s credibility vis-à-vis financial 
markets. Portugal paid the price of this imperative. However, expectations 
arose after ‘the big beasts in the Euro jungle’, France and Germany, exhibited 
also a less restrictive fiscal policy, undermining SGP credibility. Hence, the 
Eurozone was receptive to the SE-4 displaying fiscal consolidation fatigue.  
In Italy, the fiscal stance relaxed substantially after 1998. A further small 
decrease of transfer and wage payments was balanced out by a rise in 
government purchases (but only a very timid rise in public investment), leading 
to an overall small increase of primary government expenditure. At the same 
time, tax revenues declined following a broad based tax reform (von Hagen et 
al. 2001: 110). As a result, the Italian primary balance showed significant 
deterioration, taking overall deficit performance right at the edge of the three 
percent threshold (see Table 1).5 No significant progress was made on the 
reform front either, since EMU membership seemed to have relaxed in Italy the 
                                                 
5
 Following data revisions in 2005, the Italian general government deficit actually exceeded 3 percent 
in some occasions.  
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perceived need for structural reforms on the supply side (OECD Economic 
Survey 2004). 
In Portugal, the intention of redressing public discontent over EMU-induced 
fiscal austerity was evident already in the 1997 Convergence Programme. 
According to that and although a further decline of the budget deficit was 
envisaged, spending and tax measures should be geared to comply with the 
social responsibilities of the government (Portuguese Convergence Programme 
1997: 14). The procrastination of unpopular reforms in the 1990s led to a 
stagnating economy and higher inflation, with the government reversing earlier 
policies of wage moderation and thus contributing to a rapid deterioration of 
public finances (Braga de Macedo 2003: 181, 192). After the 2002 election, the 
new Conservative government revised upwards the deficit indicator for the 
previous year, bringing Portugal in breach of the three percent threshold. This 
breach occurred at a time when the ECOFIN political constellation still abided 
by fiscal orthodoxy as envisaged in the strict application of SGP rules. Thus, 
Portugal experienced disciplinary action through the invocation of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure and was forced to urgently renew fiscal 
consolidation measures (Bank of Portugal 2002). These measures brought the 
Portuguese deficit again under the three percent threshold but at great political 
cost for the incumbent Barroso government (Busemeyer 2004: 13). However, 
after the short, EDP-imposed interlude of renewed fiscal discipline, Portugal 
reversed to expansionary fiscal policy, with increasing primary deficits (see 
Table 1).    
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In Greece, after the 1999 peak of the primary surplus, primary balance 
deteriorated sharply, even registering primary deficit in 2003 for the first time 
over a decade (see Table 1). Although exceptional factors accounted partly for 
the budget deficit increase (the 2004 Olympics), this development owed much 
to excessive primary expenditure and a revenue shortfall (Bank of Greece 
2004: 23-25, 2003: 18-19). The overrun in almost all items of primary 
expenditure was offset partly by a cut in public investment budget outlays for 
the fourth consecutive year (Bank of Greece 2003: 20-21). The state of Greek 
public finances was given a new twist following the fiscal audit instructed by 
the new centre-right wing government after the 2004 elections. The audit led to 
an upward revision of Greek fiscal indicators after 2000 but did not put into 
question the achievements of the earlier fiscal consolidation period. Despite 
continuation of the extensive privatisation, re-regulation and liberalisation 
programmes, neither the labour market nor pension system rigidities have been 
successfully tackled. 
In total contrast, fiscal prudence in Spain so far has been sustained with the 
Spanish government running consistently primary surpluses (see Table 1). 
Primary current expenditure as GDP percentage remained by and large constant 
whereas revenues were not negatively affected by the 1999 and 2003 tax 
changes of a contractionary nature (Bank of Spain 2003: 121-6). As a result, 
Spain has complied with the SGP condition whereby the cyclically adjusted 
general government balance has to be close to zero or in surplus. However, 
certain developments have mitigated the success story in the post-accession 
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phase. Negotiations for a new Pact to tackle further labour market rigidities 
came apart in 2001, and the government ended up acting unilaterally. In 
addition to that, the 2001 pension reform did not involve all social actors 
(Guillén et al. 2003: 251), raising doubts about the depth and longevity of the 
extensive social concertation achieved during the fiscal consolidation stage in 
the 1990s. 
 
3.3. In sum… 
The SE-4 countries underwent prolonged fiscal consolidation in the 1990s. 
However, only in the Spanish case fiscal consolidation proved to be 
sustainable. In Italy, Portugal, and Greece, the fiscal consolidation honeymoon 
was swiftly brought to an end after EMU entry, with the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance declining significantly in the years after accession. In contrast, 
Spain has run balanced or even surplus budgets and primary budget surpluses 
consistently after accession giving tangible indications of fiscal sustainability 
(see Figure 1). Spain based its fiscal consolidation on substantial structural 
reforms that paved the way for fiscal sustainability after accession. Italy, 
Portugal and Greece relied heavily on revenue-raising policy measures that 
showcased a temporary improvement of fiscal performance. Assisted by the 
drop of interest rates and creative use of accountancy rules, the latter three 
managed to enter the Eurozone without having sufficiently tackled structural 
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rigidities. Once the threat of exclusion subsided, fiscal performance in these 
three countries deteriorated again. 
 
Figure 1: Primary Balance, Election Years and Governmental Change 
 
 
In the labour market, with differing degrees of success, wage bargaining went 
through a neocorporatist re-centralization process. This was considered a 
crucial mechanism to maintain international competitiveness in the face of lost 
monetary policy autonomy (cf. Crouch 2002). While this was an important first 
step in the course to wage moderation and signalled a substantial level of social 
concertation, only in Spain was it followed by a more far-reaching tackling of 
labour market rigidities. Furthermore, concerns about pension system viability 
led to several reform efforts in all SE-4, only to confront strong sectoral 
reactions and be withdrawn or watered down in most cases. Such was the case 
with Italy and Greece but not Spain, where reforms were far-reaching; Portugal 
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initiated reforms at a much later stage. This highlighted the limits of external 
empowerment and of EMU’s functionality as an external reform stimulus 
(Featherstone et al. 2001). Privatisation was primarily revenue-driven, not 
amounting to structural adjustment. The problem was accentuated further by 
curtailed public investment (e.g. Italy and Spain), raising concerns about future 
economic growth and the sustainability of fiscal consolidation. 
 
4. Accounting for the SE-4 Divergence 
In general, the starting point to account for budgetary upturns is the political 
partisan cycle on the basis that there is a systematic relationship between the 
partisan composition of governments and budgetary outcomes. Proponents of 
this relationship argue that leftist governments are inclined to run budget 
deficits to finance expansive social policies whereas governments led by 
rightist parties envisage a smaller role for the state and seek to reduce public 
spending (Hibbs 1977). Although the general debate remains ambivalent (e.g. 
Roubini and Sachs 1989 contra Hahm Deuk et al. 1996 or Alesina et al. 1998), 
the works with a specific EMU focus provide suggestive support to the claim 
that partisan alteration in office did not play a significant role in the course to 
fiscal adjustment (Freitag and Sciarini 2001). This holds indeed for the SE-4 as 
illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts election years in the SE-4 and the change 
of governments without revealing any relationship between the ideological 
orientation of governments and their fiscal stance.       
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To account for the different trajectories of the SE-4, we revisit the EMU 
function as an external constraint. In essence, EMU has been a regulation 
system that proscribed certain budgetary options to ensure fiscal prudence but 
prescribed policy models only in particular core aspects of monetary policy and 
not over the broad spectrum of budgetary policy (Featherstone 2004). External 
constraints are mediated by forces within the national institutional setting, 
where the modus operandi of the political system determines the degree and 
modality of internalisation and implementation of these constraints. In its 
function as an external constraint, EMU offered state actors a strategic tool for 
fiscal adjustment, the success and effectiveness of which however depended on 
the way it was internalised by each policymaking system. Especially as EMU 
touched upon the most sensitive aspects of domestic politics, i.e. labour and 
welfare reform, the particular characteristics of the domestic institutional 
setting and political leadership determined its potency as a reform stimulus. 
The starting point of divergence among the SE-4 is the socio-political context 
within which fiscal adjustment took place, in particular the degree of 
concertation, which varied considerably in terms of scope and magnitude. In 
Spain, structural reforms in the pension system and labour market were 
undertaken in a highly consensual environment of social concertation, with 
EMU pressure promoting cooperation among economic actors (Royo 2006, 
Perez 2000). The importance of this achievement becomes even more 
significant considering the unsuccessful attempts in the 1980s and early 1990s 
that failed to appeal to trade unions and to foster a stable and effective 
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neocorporatist negotiating environment (Boix 2000: 170-178). The run-up to 
EMU altered the contours of domestic policymaking, with social partners 
acknowledging the limitations of the existing system and consenting to far-
reaching reforms (Featherstone 2004). A similar concertation tendency was 
recorded in Italy in the early consolidation stage (Perez 2000, Regini and 
Regalia 1997) but waned afterwards (Molina and Rhodes 2007). Especially the 
successive reforms of the pension system highlighted the importance of 
concertation with social partners for tackling the explosive long-term 
government liabilities but their incomplete nature also underlined the limits of 
consensual policymaking (Radaelli 2002: 219, 232; Braun 1996). Similar 
efforts of a smaller scale were undertaken in Portugal as a result of a defensive 
reorientation of social actors (Royo 2002). After the 1995 general elections and 
the rise to power of Guterres’ Socialist Party, efforts to engineer labour market 
reforms were intensified on the basis of a more comprehensive Strategic Social 
Pact for the 1996-99 period. However, despite the government’s positive 
assessment of the Pact’s implementation progress, social partners either did not 
sign it or criticised its application (ILO Report),6 largely suspending the labour 
market reform zeal of the new government. Greece managed only partially to 
follow the same path, with only one major Pact signed in 1997 and all 
government initiative failing ever since (Karamessini 2007: 8). Such relative 
failure owed much to the lack of firm political commitment to social dialogue 
                                                 
6
 The largest Portuguese Trade Union (CGTP) was not a signatory partner, undermining the authority 
of the tripartite monitoring commission and the Pact in general. The Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry (CIP) voiced concern that the Pact was not effectively applied and so did the General 
Workers’ Union (UGT). 
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and partial and ad hoc attempts undermining a broader approach that could 
have taken advantage of qui pro quo negotiations (Ioannou 2000).   
The second point of divergence is linked with the agenda shaping of reform and 
its content. The SE-4 experienced different initial economic conditions, not so 
much in terms of growth but more significantly in terms of structural 
unemployment that affected both directly and indirectly the fiscal adjustment 
process. The direct effect can be seen in the –complementary to the EMU 
constraints- reform pressure; the indirect effect is manifest in the achieved level 
of social concertation, which in turn paves the way for substantial reforms. 
Contrary to the other three Mediterranean countries, whose unemployment 
levels were more moderate, Spain faced the most acute unemployment problem 
in the early 1990s, in the 20% area, which acted as an additional pressure 
gearing a reform-based consolidation.    
The third point of divergence is reform capability, in particular the government 
effectiveness and capacity to translate external (and internal) pressure into 
tangible reform outcomes. In general, EMU empowered technocratic policy 
entrepreneurs and the core executive throughout the period of Maastricht 
negotiations and beyond at the expense of political clientelism leading to 
budgetary profligacy (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). However, this process 
was not uniform and did not assume the same intensity. For example, in Italy 
although the convergence process went hand in hand with the hollowing out 
and hardening of the Italian state (Della Sala 2003, 1997), macroeconomic 
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convergence took place in a broader context of a threefold political crisis of 
authority, legitimacy and distribution between centre and periphery (Bull and 
Rhodes 1997), which limited government effectiveness and decisiveness. The 
EMU political connotations and the costs of exclusion largely obfuscated 
critical questions of broader economic strategy and structural reforms (Radaelli 
2002: 236), leading to ad hoc measures and blurring the real needs of the 
Italian economy. Along the same lines, in Greece, the capability of 
governmental actors to deliver reform was circumscribed by the structural 
weaknesses of the state and independent policy expertise (Featherstone et al. 
2001: 475). Table 4 refers to a complex indicator estimating government 
effectiveness taking into consideration a series of government-related 
dimensions like government stability, institutional failure, quality of 
bureaucracy, policy consistency, etc. (Kaufmann et al. 2007). The Table 
illustrates the higher effectiveness of the Spanish government throughout the 
period compared to the other three countries, which constitutes an additional 
factor of its capacity to deliver on the reform front.  
Table 4: Government Effectiveness Indicator in SE-4 (1996-05) 
YEAR GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
1996 0.79 0.97 1.10 1.60 
1998 0.87 0.93 1.37 1.70 
2000 0.73 0.86 1.10 1.75 
2002 0.89 0.88 1.19 1.82 
2004 0.81 0.68 1.07 1.36 
2005 0.66 0.60 1.03 1.40 
Source: Kaufmann et al. 2007, pp. 72, 82-4. 
Note: All indicators used are available at www.govindicators.org . Scores lie between 
-2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. 
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5. Conclusion: Southern Europe and the Limits to EMU 
Conditionality 
The overview of the SE-4 fiscal adjustment pre- and post-EMU accession 
confirms the two core hypotheses of the budget consolidation literature: fiscal 
consolidation achieved through structural reforms ensures by and large fiscal 
balance also in the post-accession phase. In contrast, consolidation relying on 
short-term, revenue-focused policy measures provides only temporary 
budgetary relief, capable of exhibiting nominal convergence to the external 
constraints (the Maastricht criteria in the EMU case) but dubious in terms of 
sustainability. 
At the same time, the SE-4 case shows the limits to EU conditionality policy 
and more broadly to the effectiveness of external constraints for achieving 
sustainable policy outcomes. EMU was linked in the Southern European 
countries with a broader domestic modernization programme and its appeal 
was further reinforced by a self-imposed political constraint deriving from the 
threat of exclusion from the EU’s political core. Still, however, in three out of 
the four cases examined, it brought about only a temporary exhibition of 
conformity but did not produce the necessary reform impetus to sweep 
domestic reform opposition. This suggests that the emphasis on conditionality 
policy should be given not on numerical targets and objectives but rather on the 
quality of adjustment, prescribing specific reform paths to avoid reversion and 
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lock in reforms as long as the exclusion threat still bears some weight. This 
holds particularly true for the ongoing enlargement of EMU membership with 
many new members in the anteroom. The SE-4 experience reminds us of the 
merits of both caution and patience.  
Four main conclusions derive from our analysis. First, EMU conditionality is 
and cannot be the panacea to all fiscal adjustment problems. External 
constraints and EMU conditionality policy constitute a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for sustainable fiscal adjustment. They are ‘push’ factors in 
the course of fiscal sustainability, but additional ‘pull’ factors should be at 
work to overcome well-entrenched reform opposition. We discard partisan 
cycles as an explanatory factor of fiscal adjustment divergence and attribute it 
to parameters related to reform context (social concertation), content 
(conducive agenda shaping conditions like structural unemployment), and 
capability (general government effectiveness).  
  Second, (hard) positive, pre-accession conditionality is not symmetrical 
to the (soft) negative, post-accession one. Successful adjustment to the pre-
accession conditionality brought about the prize and benefits of Eurozone 
membership (common currency, monetary stability, etc). Failure to conform to 
post-accession conditionality, as expressed by the SGP rules, would not result 
in the suspension of these benefits but only -perhaps- in the activation of 
financial sanctions. In that respect, SGP sanctions are not really as potent as 
accession incentives were. If real fiscal adjustment had not been achieved pre-
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accession (for various reasons associated with domestic economic and 
structural conditions, the political and institutional context, or the electoral 
cycle), then the overall balance between pressures and constraints would most 
probably tend to be even more unfavourable to fiscal adjustment after the 
country had entered EMU. This strengthens the argument in support of a front-
loaded sequencing of reform. In addition, the considerable flexibility and 
discretion of the SGP function, especially after its 2005 overhaul, though well 
justified on economic grounds, has had the perverse effect of probably blurring 
the clarity of the fiscal adjustment objective, increasing target mobility. In that 
respect, the Pact’s ability to operate as an effective mechanism of exogenously 
imposed discipline has been compromised, leading to less rigorous compliance 
efforts.   
Third, EMU conditionality policy should be refocused. The principal issue that 
emerges goes beyond success or failure to adjust to the set criteria. The 
question of fiscal adjustment should not be that of one-off compliance but of 
the ability to sustain fiscal balance over the long run. While the Maastricht 
convergence game was played as a one-off game, the EMU post-accession 
game is a dynamic, iterated game of indefinite horizon. Although sustainability 
of public finances was meant to be a central component of the Maastricht 
architecture, it was relegated into second priority due to the political decision 
for a more accommodative interpretation of the public debt criterion. The 
reinstatement of fiscal sustainability and the debt criterion prescribe structural 
adjustments (pension system, labour market, etc.) and force a revisiting of the 
  34 
budgetary revenue/expenditure structure. These necessities should be also 
reflected in the EMU conditionality policy. 
Finally, and rather ominously, the force of conditionality relies on the attraction 
of membership. In the first half of the 2000s the Eurozone was a less attractive 
place to be compared to that of 1999. Recently this has been changing again, 
thanks to German recovery. This cannot be devoid of implications as to the 
alacrity with which Eurozone members (or for that matter even prospective 
members) would be willing to undergo politically painful fiscal adjustment 
efforts. 
  35 
 
References  
Alesina, A., Perotti, R. and Tavares, J. (1998) ‘The Political Economy of Fiscal 
Adjustments’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 197-248. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996) ‘Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: 
Composition and Macroeconomic Effects’. IMF Working Paper, WP 
96/70.   
Balmaseda, M. and Sebastián, M. (2003) ‘Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May 
Not Be Enough’, in S. Royo and P.C. Manuel (eds.) Spain and Portugal in 
the European Union: the first fifteen years. London: Frank Cass.  
Bank of Greece (various years) Report of the Governor for the Year...,  Athens: 
Bank of Greece. 
Banca d’ Italia (various years) Report of the Governor for the Year…, Rome: 
Banca d’ Italia. 
Banco de Portugal (various years) Report of the Governor for the Year …, 
Lisboa: Banco de Portugal.  
Banco de España (various years) Report of the Governor for the Year …, 
Madrid: Banco de España.  
Blavoukos, S. and Pagoulatos, G. (2008) ‘Negotiating in Stages: National 
Positions and the Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact’. European 
Journal of Political Research, 47: 2, 247-67. 
Boix, C. (2000) ‘Managing the Spanish Economy within Europe’. Special Issue 
on ‘Europeanization and the Southern Periphery’, South European Society 
and Politics, 5: 2, 165-190. 
Braga de Macedo, J. (2003) ‘Portugal’s European Integration: The Good 
Student with a Bad Fiscal Constitution’, in S. Royo and P.C. Manuel 
(eds.) Spain and Portugal in the European Union: the first fifteen years. 
London: Frank Cass. 
Braun, M. (1996) ‘The Confederated Trade Unions and the Dini Government: 
The Grand Return to Neo-Corporatism?’, in M. Caciagli and D.I. Kertzer 
(eds.) Italian Politics: The Stalled Transition. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 
Bull, M. J. and Rhodes, M. (eds.) (1997) Crisis and Transition in Italian 
Politics. London: Franc Cass. 
Busemeyer, M. R. (2004) ‘Chasing Maastricht: The Impact of the EMU on the 
Fiscal Performance of Member States’. European Integration online 
Papers, 8:8, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008a.htm 
Buti, M. and Guidice, G. (2002) ‘Maastricht Fiscal Rules at Ten: an 
Assessment’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40: 5, 823-47. 
  36 
Buti, M. and Sapir, A. (1998) Economic Policy in EMU. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Checkel, J. T. (2000) ‘Compliance and Conditionality’. ARENA Working 
Papers, No. 00/18. 
Clifton, J., Comin, F. and Diaz Fuentes, D. (2003) Privatisation in the 
European Union. Enterprises and Integration. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.  
Crouch, C. (2002) ‘The Euro and Labour Market and Wage Policies’, in K. 
Dyson (ed.) European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, 
and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Della Sala, V. (2003) Politics Without a Centre: Italy Between Globalization 
and Europeanization. New York: Palgrave. 
Della Sala, V. (1997) ‘Hollowing out and Hardening the State: European 
Integration and the Italian Economy’. West European Politics, 20:1, 14-
33. 
Documento di Programmazione Economico-Finanziaria (1991). Rome: 
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze. 
Dyson, K. (2006) ‘Euro Entry as Defining and Negotiating Fit: Conditionality, 
Contagion, and Domestic Politics’, in K. Dyson (ed.) Enlarging the Euro 
Area. External Empowerment and Domestic Transformation in East 
Central Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999) The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating 
Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1996) ‘Italy and EMU as a “Vincolo Esterno”: 
Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State’. South European 
Society and Politics, 1:2, 272-99. 
Featherstone, K. (2004) ‘The Political Dynamics of the Vincolo Esterno: the 
Emergence of EMU and the Challenge to the European Model’, in A. 
Martin and G. Ross (eds.) Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration 
and the European Model of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Featherstone, K., Kazamias, G. and Papadimitriou, D. (2001) ‘The Limits of 
External Empowerment: EMU, Technocracy and Reform of the Greek 
Pension System’. Political Studies, 49, 462-80. 
Freitag, M. and Sciarini, P. (2001) ‘The Political Economy of Budget Deficits 
in the European Union: The Role of International Constraints and 
Domestic Structure’. European Union Politics, 2: 2, 163-89.   
Grabbe, H. (2001) ‘How Does Europeanisation Affect CEWE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 8:6, 1013-31.  
  37 
Grabbe, H. (1999) ‘A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU 
Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants’. EUI 
Working Papers, RSC No. 99/12.  
Greek Convergence Program (1994 – updated version). Athens: Ministry of 
National Economy and Finance. 
Guillén, A., Álvarez, S. and Pedro Adão e Silva (2003) ‘Redesigning the 
Spanish and Portuguese Welfare States: The Impact of Accession into the 
European Union’, in S. Royo and P.C. Manuel (eds.) Spain and Portugal 
in the European Union: the first fifteen years. London: Frank Cass. 
von Hagen, J. (2005) ‘Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU and 
Japan’. CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 5330.  
von Hagen, J., Hallett, A.H. and Strauch, R.R. (2001) ‘Budgetary 
Consolidation in EMU’. Economic Papers, No. 148, Brussels: European 
Commission. 
Haggard, S. (2000) ‘Interests, Institutions, and Policy Reform’, in A. O. 
Krueger (ed.) Economic Policy Reform: the Second Stage. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hahm Deuk, S., Kamlet, M.S. and Mowery, D. (1996) ‘The Political Economy 
of Deficit Spending in Nine Industrialized Parliamentary Democracies. 
The Role of Fiscal Institutions’. Comparative Political Studies 29, 52-77. 
Heipertz, M. and Verdun, A. (2004) ‘The dog that would never bite? What we 
can learn from the origins of the Stability and Growth Pact’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 11:5, 765-80. 
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’. American 
Political Science Review 71, 1467-87. 
Hughes, J., Sasses, G. and Gordon, C. (2004) ‘Conditionality and Compliance 
in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of 
Sub-national Government’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42:3, 
523-51.  
International Labour Organization (ILO) Report, Social Pacts in Portugal: 
Strategic Social Pact, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/pacts/portugal1.htm (6 
May 2006). 
Ioannou, C. (2000) ‘Social Pacts in Hellenic Industrial Relations: Odysseus or 
Sisiphus’, in G. Fajertag and P. Pochet (eds.) Social Pacts in Europe – 
New Dynamics, 2nd Ed. Brussels: ETUI. 
Karamessini, M. (2007) ‘The Southern European Social Model: Changes and 
Continuities in Recent Decades’. Discussion Paper, International Institute 
for Labour Studies.    
  38 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2007) Governance Matters VI: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2006. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 4280. 
Killick, T. with Gunatilaka, R. and Marr, A. (1998) Aid and the Political 
Economy of Policy Change. London: Routledge. 
McDermott, C. and Wescott, J.R.F. (1996) ‘An Empirical Analysis of Fiscal 
Adjustments’. IMF Staff Papers, 43, 725-53. 
Molina, O. and Rhodes, M. (2007) ‘Industrial Relations and the Welfare State 
in Italy: Assessing the Potential of Negotiated Change’. West European 
Politics, 30:4, 803-29.   
Moravcsik, A. (1994) ‘Why the European Community Strengthens the State: 
Domestic Politics and International Cooperation’. Center for European 
Studies Working Paper 52, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Mulas-Granados, C. (2006) Economics, Politics and Budgets: the Political 
Economy of Fiscal Consolidations in Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
OECD (various years) Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (various years) Economic Surveys: Italy. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (various years) Economic Surveys: Portugal. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (various years) Economic Surveys: Spain. Paris: OECD.  
Pagoulatos, G. (2005) ‘The Politics of Privatisation: Redrawing the Public-
Private Boundary’. West European Politics, 28:2, 358-80. 
Pamp, O. (2007) ‘Partisan Preferences Squeezed Through Political Institutions: 
Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment Decisions in the European Union’.  
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=592402 (13 November 
2007). 
Papadimitriou, D. (2005) ‘The Limits of Engineering Collective Escape: The 
2000 Reform of the Greek Labour Market’. West European Politics, 28:2, 
381-401. 
Perez, S. (2000) ‘From Decentralization to Reorganization: Explaining the 
Return to National Bargaining in Italy and Spain’. Comparative Politics, 
32:4, 437-59.  
Perotti, R., Strauch, R.R., and von Hagen, J. (1998) Sustainable Public 
Finances. London: CEPR. 
Portuguese Convergence Program (1997). Lisboa: Ministry of Finance. 
Radaelli, C. (2002) ‘The Italian State and the Euro: Institutions, Discourse, and 
Policy Regimes’, in K. Dyson (ed.) European States and the Euro: 
Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
  39 
Regini, M. and Regalia, I. (1997) ‘Employers, Unions, and the State: the 
Resurgence of Concertation in Italy?’. West European Politics, 25:1, 210-
30.  
Rotte, R. (1998) ‘International Commitment and Domestic Politics: A Note on 
the Maastricht Case’. European Journal of International Relations, 4:1, 
131-42. 
Rotte, R. and Zimmermann, K.F. (1998) ‘Fiscal Restraint and the Political 
Economy of EMU’. Public Choice, 94, 385-406. 
Roubini, N. and Sachs, J. (1989) ‘Government Spending and Budget Deficits in 
the Industrial Countries’. Economic Policy, 8, 99-132. 
Royo, S. (2006) ‘Beyond Confrontation: the Resurgence of Social Bargaining 
in Spain in the 1990s’. Comparative Political Studies, 39: 8, 969-95.  
Royo, S. (2002) ‘‘A New Century of Corporatism?’ Corporatism in Spain and 
Portugal’. West European Politics, 25:3, 77-104. 
Schimmelfennig, F., Egert, S. and Knobel, H. (2003). ‘Costs, Commitment and 
Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, 
Slovakia and Turkey’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:3, 495-518. 
Smith, K. E. (1997) ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations 
with Third Countries: How Effective?’. EUI Working Papers, SPS No. 
97/7. 
Stallings, B. (1992) ‘International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, 
Stabilization, and Structural Reform’, in S. Haggard and R.R. Kaufman 
(eds.) The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ. Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2000) ‘Reflections on the Theory and Practice of Reform’, in A. 
O. Krueger (ed.) Economic Policy Reform: the Second Stage. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Tinios, P. (2005) ‘Pension Reform in Greece: ‘Reform by Instalments’ - A 
Blocked Process?’. West European Policy, 28:2, 402-19. 
Toninelli, P.A. (2000) ‘The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprises: The 
Framework’, in P.A. Toninelli (ed.) The Rise and Fall of State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Western World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
  40 
Other papers in this series  
 
12.  Blavoukos, Spyros and Pagoulatos, George, Fiscal Adjustment in Southern 
Europe: the Limits of EMU Conditionality, GreeSE Paper No12, March 2008 
11. Featherstone, Kevin, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and the Greek case: explaining 
the constraints on domestic reform?. GreeSE Paper No11, February 2008 
10. Monastiriotis, Vassilis, Quo Vadis Southeast Europe? EU Accession, Regional 
Cooperation and the need for a Balkan Development Strategy, GreeSE Paper No10, 
January 2008 
9.  Paraskevopoulos, Christos, Social Capital and Public Policy in Greece. GreeSE 
Paper No9, December 2007 
8.  Anastassopoulos George, Filippaios Fragkiskos and Phillips Paul, An ‘eclectic’ 
investigation of tourism multinationals’ activities: Evidence from the Hotels and 
Hospitality Sector in Greece, GreeSE Paper No8, November 2007 
7. Watson, Max, Growing Together? – Prospects for Economic Convergence and 
Reunification in Cyprus, GreeSE Paper No7, October 2007 
6.  Stavridis, Stelios, Anti-Americanism in Greece: reactions to the 11-S, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, GreeSE Paper No6, September 2007 
5.  Monastiriotis, Vassilis, Patterns of spatial association and their persistence 
across socio-economic indicators: the case of the Greek regions, GreeSE Paper No5, 
August 2007 
4.  Papaspyrou, Theodoros, Economic Policy in EMU: Community Framework, 
National Strategies and Greece, GreeSE Paper No4, July 2007 
3.  Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Subsidising Europe’s Industry: is Greece the exception?, 
GreeSE Paper No3, June 2007 
2.  Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis, Institutions and the Implementation of EU Public 
Policy in Greece: the case of public procurement, GreeSE Paper No2, May 2007 
1.  Monastiriotis, Vassilis and Tsamis, Achilleas, Greece’s new Balkan Economic 
Relations: policy shifts but no structural change, GreeSE Paper No1, April 2007 
 
 
 
 
Other papers from the Hellenic Observatory 
Papers from past series published by the Hellenic Observatory are available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pubs/DP_oldseries.htm. 
